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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the Bill of Rights does not provide safeguards at sentenc-
ing, but in the late eighteenth century, no safeguards were needed. At
that time, sentences were fixed for the crime, not individualized by the
sentencing judge to fit the defendant. Today the convicted defendant
needs protection from mistakes and arbitrary and capricious action
during sentencing just as much as the accused during trial. In a sector
of the judicial process in which the stakes for society and the defendant
are so high as they are at sentencing, and in which procedural safeguards
are inadequate, there is a strong case for developing a body of substan-
tive standards to ensure that sentences are not based on inaccurate
assumptions of little probative value. Disclosure of the presentence re-
port and opportunity to rebut adverse charges is certainly a safeguard
that should be guaranteed to the criminal defendant. However, as
Weston has shown, that alone is not sufficient. Perhaps the best solution
would be to provide for an appellate system to review sentences of all
defendants. Short of such a radical change, however, the solution of the
Weston court may provide a viable alternative.
MARVIN ALLEN BETHUNE
Professional Responsibility- Covenants Not To Compete Between At-
torneys
A, a lawyer, wishes to hire X, another lawyer, to workfor him in a
small town in western North Carolina. Because the town is small, A
would like somehow to ensure that X will not later leave his employment
and set up a competing practice in the same community. A most likely
will ask X to agree in writing not to practice law in the town for one
year after the termination of employment. X, understanding A's
position and intending to leave the town after a few years anyway,
agrees. Whether or not this is a common situation in this state or around
the country, it appears that this would be a reasonable approach to the
problem provided the lawyers have a full understanding of their con-
tract. However, according to the Council of the North Carolina State
Bar, A, and probably X, is guilty of unethical conduct.
On October 21, 1971, the Council responded to two inquries related
to the problem of A and X:
(1) Is it unethical for an attorney employing another attorney to
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include as a part of the agreement between them a restrictive covenant
prohibiting the employee from practicing law in a specified local area
for a specified time after the termination of the employment?
(2) May a restrictive covenant upon the individual practice of
law by a withdrawing partner be incorporated into a partnership agree-
ment?'
The Council answered the first inquiry affirmatively and the second
negatively. The Council's opinions were in part based on ABA Formal
Opinion 300,2 which reasoned that since Canon 27 prohibits solicitation,
an employee-lawyer could not actively seek out the business of those
clients of his past employer (or partner) with whom he had contact.
Furthermore, the ABA Committee felt that Canons 6 and 37 bind the
lawyer to preserve the secrets and confidences of clients of his former
employer and that Canon 7 prohibits interference with the work of
another attorney.' Since a restrictive covenant is not necessary to en-
force the provisions of the Canons of Ethics and since the Canons
safeguard any protectible interest, a restrictive covenant would be im-
proper.
The North Carolina Council also relied on the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A),' which provides
that "a lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement benefits."
Finally, the Council acknowledged the policy argument that an attorney
is licensed by the state and, regardless of his location, should be free to
provide assistance to all potential clients who desire to engage him-or,
stated conversely, the legal profession considers the right of a client to
choose his own counsel to be of paramount importance.6
At common law, the covenant not to compete was considered a
'N.C. STATE BAR COUNCIL, OPINIONS, No. 776 (1971), reported, 18 THE NORTH CAROLINA
BAR no. 4 at 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited as N.C. BAR].
'ABA CoMiM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 300 (1961).
3Canons 6, 7, 27, and 37 refer to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which were replaced
by the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1970. North Carolina is not among the majority of
states that have adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility.
'All the disciplinary rules are mandatory in nature and state the minimum standard of con-
duct. Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
5The Council's use of this citation would seem to indicate that X would also be guilty of
unethical conduct.
'N.C. BAR 13.
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"restraint of trade" and was, therefore, not upheld.7 The strict view
against these covenants was gradually eroded8 and the courts began to
uphold them when the equities of the case required it.' Though some
state statutes declare restrictive covenants of this type void, many states
uphold them.' 0 The general tests applied by the courts to determine their
validity are necessity and reasonableness, and a covenant normally will
be upheld if it is not excessive." To determine if the restriction is exces-
sive, the courts look at the scope 2 and duration of the restriction.' 3
These factors are balanced against the employer's protectible interests,
the hardship imposed on the employee, and the interests of the public.'
Courts have even gone so far as to uphold a restrictive covenant that
was excessive in scope if it was possible to salvage some acceptable
restraint out of the covenant. 5 The "blue-pencil" test " and the doctrine
of selective construction' 7 are the two most common methods used by
the courts to enforce some portion of an excessive covenant. 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has stated that restrictive covenants will be
upheld if they are in writing, for valuable and contemporaneous consid-
7Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414), cited in Comment, Contracts in
Restraint of Trade: Employee Covenants Not to Compete, 21 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 214 (1967).
'Apparently the first case to uphold a restrictive covenant was Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wins.
181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). A complete discussion of the developments after Mitchel can
be found in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Blake].
'A distinction should be drawn between restraints incident to the sale of a business, discussion
of which is beyond the scope of this note, and post-employment restraints aimed at prevention of
competitive use of information or relationships peculiar to the employer. See Blake 647.
'"E.g., Louisiana declares such contracts void as against public policy except where the em-
ployer incurs expenses in the specialized training of the employee. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921
(1964). North Dakota and Oklahoma declare all such contracts void except those between partners
in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership and those ancillary to the sale of the good will
of a business. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1966).
The North Carolina General Statutes are silent on the subject.
"RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 513-15 (1932) provide a basis for the tests used. See
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955).
'
2E.g., Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944); see Blake 675-77.
'
3E.g., Asheville Associates, Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 121 S.E.2d 593 (1961); see Note,
Covenants Not to Compete, 38 N.C.L. Rev. 395 (1960).
"Comment, 21 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J., supra note 7, at 215; s-e Blake 651-87.
15E.g., Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
"So named because the covenant will be upheld if the excessive restraint can be eliminated
by merely marking out the objectionable portions. Id. at 256, 120 S.E.2d at 747 (dissenting
opinion).
"Creter v. Creter, 52 N.J. Super. 197, 145 A.2d 149 (1958).
"For a thorough discussion of these tests see Note, Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. REV. 691 (1972).
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eration, reasonable as to time and territory embraced, fair to the parties,
and not against public policy. 9 Since the Council made no reference to
the scope of reasonableness of the restrictive covenant it was consider-
ing, it must have been concerned with the public policy involved.
Other state ethics committees that have considered the problem of
restrictive covenants in lawyers' employment and partnership agree-
ments have taken varied approaches. At least one committee has gone
to the opposite extreme from the North Carolina and American Bar
Association committees and has held that a covenant not to practice law
is ethical if entered into between lawyers with no substantial inequality
of bargaining power. Furthermore, this committee held that violation
of the covenant is unethical." However, many bar committees agree
with the North Carolina opinion.2'
Perhaps the best statement of the underlying policy reasons for the
North Carolina opinion is articulated in the American Bar Association
Formal Opinion 300, from which the Council quoted extensively. In
1945, the ABA Committee had stated that it was improper for an
attorney to purchase the practice and good will of an attorney who was
not his partner because the good will of an attorney is not an asset to
be bought and sold. This led the Committee to conclude that if the
conduct in question can be considered an effort by attorneys to "barter
in clients" it is unprofessional.22 The view of the ABA Committee was
further substantiated by the language of Canon 7, which says that
"[e]fforts, direct or indirect, in any way to encroach upon the profes-
sional employment of another lawyer, are unworthy of those who should
be brethren at the Bar . . . ."2 In Formal Opinion 300, the ABA
Committee relied on this 1945 opinion and the Canons24 dealing with
the prohibition against solicitation and the preservation of the secrets
and confidences of clients. The Committee reasoned that since these
canons can be enforced without reliance on restrictive covenants and
since the Canons of Ethics adequately protect any protectable interest,
"Asheville Associates, Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C. 400, 121 S.E.2d 593 (1961).
"Opinion 148 (!11. 1958), reported. DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION OPINIONS II (Maru ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST].
21Opinion 127 (Ore. 1963), reported, DIGEST 435; Opinion 3 (Allegheny County, N.Y. 1962),
reported. DIGEST 445; Opinion 831 (N.Y. City, N.Y. 1957), reported, DIGEST 334; Opinion 688
(N.Y. City, N.Y. 1945), reported, DIGEST 318.
2"ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 266 (1945).
2"ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7.21ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Nos. 6, 27 & 37.
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a restrictive covenant would be improper and inconsistent with the pro-
fessional status of attorneys.
One problem with the reasoning of the ABA Committee and the
Council of the North Carolina State Bar is that it fails to take into
consideration the increased tolerance that the courts have displayed for
this type of restrictive covenant. 5 Courts have been required to consider
the public policy when faced with restrictive covenants in other types of
employment contracts. They have upheld the restrictions even 6 though
the practice involved could easily have been considered a "profession
and a privilege granted by the state. '27 It is at least conceivable that the
Council may find itself in the position of attempting to discipline an
attorney for entering into a restrictive covenant that the courts have
already enforced. 28
Enforcement of the Council's opinion presents still another prob-
lem. The statute empowering the North Carolina Council to administer
punishment lists the grounds upon which the Council may proceed
against an attorney. Only two of those grounds might possibly be inter-
preted as empowering the Council to discipline attorneys for entering
into restrictive covenant contracts: that dealing with violations of can-
ons of ethics and that allowing punishment for "conduct involving will-
ful deceit, fraud or any other unprofessional conduct."2 Since the Coun-
cil did not state that the use of a restrictive covenant violates a specific
canon of ethics, the only possible section of the statute upon which the
Council can rely is that allowing punishment for "unprofessional
conduct." Therefore, enforcement of the Council's opinion will put it
in the anomalous position of finding that it is unprofessional for an
attorney to include in an employment contract he drafts for his own
',See text accompanying notes 8-19 supra.
2
'See, e.g., Toulmin v. Becker, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 109, 124 N.E.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1954) (patent
attorney); Scadron's Sons v. Susskind, 132 Misc. 406, 229 N.Y.S. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (optometr-
ist); Dodd, Contracts Not to Practice Medicine, 23 B.U.L. Rav. 305 (1943) (doctors). See also
cases cited in Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955).
27N.C. BAR 13.
"ln Hicklin v. O'Brien, I 1 111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956), the court, while upholding
a restrictive covenant between doctors, stated that "[ilt is not necessary for us to determine whether
the contract violates some canon of professional ethics." Id. at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
21N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-28 (1965) states that an appointed council "(2) May administer the
punishments . . . for any of the following causes: . . . d. Conduct involving willful deceit or fraud
or any other unprofessional conduct . . . f. The viblation of any of the canons of ethics which have
been adopted and promulgated by the Council of the North Carolina State Bar." (Emphasis
added.)
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professional employees the same covenant that he can, and in some
instances must, include in the employment contracts he drafts for clients
from all other professions, businesses, and trades. Yet, as a British court
said, "[t]he case of a solicitor is eminently a case where some protection
is almost always necessary if the employee is a person who is being
employed in a more or less confidential position, where he does come
into touch with, and does get to know, some, at any rate, of his em-
ployer's clients.""0
Thus the Council declined to express reasons of its own for holding
the covenant not to compete unethical and instead relied principally
upon ABA Opinion 300,31 which in turn had relied very heavily upon
the prohibition against attempts to "barter in clients". Although this is
a catching phrase, examination of its source leads to the conclusion that
it should not be used in the context of covenants not to compete. The
phrase "bartering in clients" was originally used in an ABA opinion
which found it unethical for an attorney to purchase the business and
good will of another attorney." Purchase of the good will of a lawyer
would indeed be bartering in clients. There would always be some hag-
gling over how much a lawyer should pay to get a particular client, and
once the sale is made the clients presumably would be required to go to
the purchasing attorney. However, there is a difference between at-
tempting to buy the good will and business of a lawyer and merely
inserting a non-competition covenant in an employment contract. In the
former the clients are, at least theoretically, forced to go to the purchas-
ing attorney or firm, and the clients are the subject matter of the trans-
action; but in the latter, the agreement does not purport to control the
clients, who are in precisely the same status before and after the employ-
ment contract is entered into. A possible exception is the situation in
which the size of the town is such that only a few lawyers are practicing
there. A demand by an employer for a covenant not to compete may
further reduce the clients' choice by discouraging lawyers who do not
wish to be so bound from seeking employment in the community. Of
course, this is not related to bartering in clients, and an employer in a
small town may, because of limited clientele, have precisely the type of
"Dickson v. Jones, [1939] 3 All E.R. 182, 188 (Ch.).
"ABA Informal Opinion Number 1072, upon which the Council also relies, merely restates
the position of opinion 300, as does Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Therefore, these enunciations are as questionable bases for the Council's decision
as was the original opinion.
"1ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 266 (1945).
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protectible interests anticipated by the courts.
Somewhere between the purchase of the good will of an attorney
and the hiring of a new associate is the partnership agreement between
practicing attorneys. A lawyer from the same community entering into
a partnership agreement will be bringing his established clients with
him. If, as a condition to the agreement, he is required to forego the
practice of law in the community upon the dissolution of the partnership
it can be argued that he is trading his clients for the right to be a partner.
However, the clients are free to choose any attorney they may wish
during the course of the partnership, and upon termination of the part-
nership the clients may still go to the established firm upon which they
were relying or they may go elsewhere. The converse of the underlying
policy that clients should be free to choose their own attorneys is the
right of an attorney to refuse any case. 33 Certainly this right is no less
viable when it happens to be exercised in the course of entering into a
partnership agreement.
It is suggested that the Council's opinion disregards the reality of
the situation. The employing lawyer has a definite interest in protecting
himself, especially when one considers the inherently confidential rela-
tionships formed in the practice of law.34 The courts are likely to en-
force a reasonable covenant not to compete without regard to the opin-
ion of an ethics committee.3 5 In addition, the Council itself may have
difficulty in enforcing its decision because of the vagueness of the statute
involved.36 Finally, it is submitted that the legal profession should be
free to do for itself at least as much as it may be professionally required
to do for its clientele.
TIMOTHY J. SIMMONS
33ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 31. But cf. Ethical Consideration 2-26, ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
31A discussion of the type of employment relationshili that requires protection for the em-
ployee is in Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1456, 1468 (1920), which was cited with approval in Welcome Wagon
Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 255 N.C. 244, 249, 120 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1961).
15E.g., Hicklin v. O'Brien, I 1 111. App.2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956).
"See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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